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The paper proposes a formal analysis of a theory of norms resulting from pulling together
Anderson’s reduction, the analysis of counts-as, and a novel approach to the formal
representation of language granularity in modal logic. We refer to such theory as the
ascriptive view of norms. Concretely, the paper proposes a new formal deﬁnition of counts-
as statements which is used as a basis for a new reduction of the deontic notion of
obligation. The formal properties of these new notions are thoroughly investigated and
put in perspective with related work. Finally, they are also applied to provide novel formal
analyses of standard benchmark problems in deontic logic such as Chisholm’s paradox and
Jørgensen’s dilemma.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The present paper pulls together independent research threads which have been pursued in the literature on the (formal)
analysis of norms. Such threads are the reductionist approach to norms started with [1–3,26], the study of counts-as initiated
in [37,38] and ﬁrst pursued with formal means in [24], and an ascriptive view of norms which we can track back to [34] and
which has been developed in legal theory, among others, in [23]. According to this latter, norms are actually ascriptions of
deontic properties to actions or states of affairs. In short, to state norms means to create new properties, which are somehow
inexistent in reality (e.g., Anderson’s “violation”), to create new words to name them, and consequently to predicate them
of the relevant states of affairs or actions.
The paper proposes a formal analysis of this view of norms which builds, in the ﬁrst place, on Anderson’s reduction,
in the second place, on the formal analysis of counts-as developed in [20,19,18,21,15] and, in the third place, on a formal
characterization of the language creation aspect of the ascriptive view of norms. As a result, a comprehensive formal theory
of norms is presented and formalized in modal logic.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes Anderson’s reduction and provides a contextual version of it.
Part of the section consists of a summary of the results presented in [20,19,18,21,15] and provides the ground for a counts-
as based view of Anderson’s reduction. At the end of the section the ascriptive view of norms is exposed in more details to
introduce Section 3. There, a language-based notion of indistinguishability between propositional models is introduced and
a modal logic, ﬁrst studied in [28,27], is exposed for reasoning about it. This language-based notion of indistinguishability
will be the key for capturing the phenomenon of language creation inherent in the ascriptive view of norms. A simple
example is used throughout the exposition of the formalism. Section 4 applies the formalisms presented in Sections 2
and 3, providing a formal characterization of the ascriptive view of norms in the guise of a new notion of counts-as and a
corresponding reduction of deontic operators. This new notion of counts-as and the logic of obligation resulting from the
corresponding reduction are investigated from the point of view of their structural properties, compared with the forms of
counts-as studied in [20,19,18,21,15], with standard deontic logic and, ﬁnally, also with Makinson’s work at the intersection
of classical and non-monotonic logic [32,33]. Section 5 puts the formal deﬁnitions of Section 4 at work providing a formal
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sketches future research lines. Appendix A provides further formal details about Section 2.
2. Anderson’s reduction revisited
The present section introduces a version of Anderson’s reduction based on a modal logic of context.
2.1. Anderson’s reduction: a brief historical look
By ‘Anderson’s reduction’ the present paper intends, in general, the approach to deontic logic which interprets deontic
notions (e.g., ‘obligation’, ‘permission’, ‘prohibition’) in terms of evaluative or prohairetic ones (e.g., ‘good’, ‘ideal, ‘bad’,
‘violation’). In [10] the observation was ﬁrst put forth that statements such as ‘it ought to be the case that ϕ ’ could be
analyzed as ‘either ϕ or otherwise something bad is the case’ (more formally, ‘if ¬ϕ then V’). As neatly put in [4], the
formalization of such intuition via material implication, i.e., Oϕ := ¬ϕ → V would not do as, in propositional logic, such
deﬁnition would make formula ϕ → Oϕ valid.1 So the nature of the reduction really resides in the formal rendering of
the ‘if . . . then . . .’ locution in ‘if ¬ϕ then V’. Anderson and, independently, Kanger have addressed this problem by modal
means in [1,3,2] and, respectively, in [26].2
In particular, [1] shows that, by expanding the alphabet of monadic modal logic with a dedicated atom V, standard
deontic logic, i.e., modal system D, can be embedded as a subsystem in logic T extended with axiom ¬V (stating that the
violation is not ‘necessary’) and the following deﬁnition:
Oϕ := (♦ϕ ∧♦¬ϕ) ∧ ¬♦(¬ϕ ∧ ¬V) (1)
that is, ϕ ought to be the case if and only if it is ‘contingent’ and it is ‘impossible’ that its negation occurs together with no
violation, where ‘contingent’ and ‘impossible’ have to be interpreted as the diamonds of system T3 or of a stronger system.
As a consequence:
“[. . .] any system of alethic modal logic [systems included between T and S5] (satisfying certain minimal conditions)
gives rise, by addition of a propositional constant [the violation constant] and suitable deﬁnitions, to a system of deontic
logic” [3, p. 100]
However, as shown in [6], the reduction can be obtained already within K extended with the axiom ♦¬V and with the sort
of deﬁnition that is nowadays most typically referred to as ‘Anderson’s reduction’, that is:
Oϕ :=(¬ϕ → V) (2)
In general, depending on the logic of the  operator, different versions of the reduction can be obtained, and various
alternative versions of Anderson’s reduction have been proposed, also recently, in the literature (see, for instance, [12,28,
29]).
2.2. Terminological necessities
We start off by presenting the form of reduction based on system S5, which was already taken into consideration in
[3], and to which we add a semantic twist. It is well-known that S5 is the modal logic of universal quantiﬁcation since
the so-called universal modality (i.e., the modality interpreted on the W × W , where W is the model’s domain) is an S5
modality [9]. Now, viewing the  modality in Anderson’s reduction as the universal modality, which we denote by [u],
conveys a key semantic hint:
M,w | [u](¬ϕ → V) iff ∀w ′ ∈ W : M,w ′ | ¬ϕ → V (3)
iff I(¬ϕ) ⊆ I(V) (4)
where M is a model for the modal language with universal modality [u], W is its domain and I its valuation function.
Formulae (3) and (4) show a very precise interpretation of Anderson’s reduction: ϕ is obligatory means that all states (i.e.,
possible worlds) are such that either ϕ is true or, if ϕ is false, then a violation is also true. In this view, deontic statements
amount to set-theoretic relations concerning the interpretation I(V) of the atom V.4
1 As Anderson himself puts it:
“I hope we can all agree that such a supposition should really occasion nothing more than general laughter” [4, p. 349].
2 It might be instructive to recall that Kanger’s reduction makes use of a constant Q denoting normative ideality, or the absence of violation [26]. In this
case, the fact that ϕ is obligatory means that ‘if Q then ϕ ’. From a formal point of view this amounts to a contrapositive version of Anderson’s reduction.
3 The proof was done syntactically by deriving the axioms of D from T∪ {¬V, Formula (1)}.
4 For more details on this view, the reader is referred to [15].
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and the violation atom, what happens if we want to consider, under the same formalism, deontic statements belonging
to several different normative systems? Technically speaking, we then look for operators that can “locally” behave like a
universal modality, but that can “globally” behave in a weaker way allowing for the representation of different and possibly
inconsistent deontic statements at the same time. We should ﬁnd a multi-modal logic such that: a) the logic enables as
many modalities as the normative systems we intend to represent; b) these modalities retain as many characteristics of [u]
as possible; c) the logic allows for the satisﬁability of expressions such as: [i](¬ϕ → V) ∧ ¬[ j](¬ϕ → V). To put it roughly,
we look for a modal logic by means of which to express contextual terminological necessity.
2.3. A modal logic of context
In logic, contexts have been studied as sets of models [14]. Now, if the models considered are models of propositional
languages, then contexts can be studied as sets of possible worlds [39]. The present section exposes a logic based on this
view.5 This logic will then be used to characterize the type of necessity involved in Anderson’s reduction, thereby delivering
a contextual version of it.
2.3.1. Syntax of Cxtu
The syntax of Cxtu is the syntax of a multi-modal language LCxtn [9] where n is the cardinality of the set C of context
indexes. The alphabet of LCxtn contains: an at most countable set P of propositional atoms p; the set of boolean connectives{¬,∧}; a ﬁnite non-empty set C of context indexes containing the constant index u of the universal context. Metavariables
i, j, . . . are used to denote elements of C. The set of formulae ϕ of LCxtn is deﬁned by the following BNF:
LCxtn : ϕ ::= 
|p|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ|[i]ϕ
where i denotes elements in C. The remaining Boolean connectives ∨ and → as well as the dual modal operator 〈i〉 can be
deﬁned as usual.
2.3.2. Semantics of Cxtu
Language LCxtn is given a semantics via the class of Cxt frames F = 〈W , {Wi}i∈C〉 such that:
• W is a non-empty set of states;
• {Wi}i∈C is a family of subsets of W such that Wu = W ∈ {Wi}i∈C .
Intuitively, these frames consist of the domain W and of a ﬁnite number n = |C| of subsets of W among which W itself.
Such subsets straightforwardly model the conception of contexts as sets of (propositional) models sketched above. Notice
that the domain W represents the global, or universal, context.
Models are, as usual, structures 〈F ,I〉 where F belongs to the class Cxt and I is a valuation function I : P−→ P(W ).
Satisfaction is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Satisfaction based on Cxt frames). Let M be a model built on a Cxt frame.
M,w | 

M,w | p iff w ∈ I(p)
M,w | ¬ϕ1 iff not M,w | ϕ1
M,w | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M,w | ϕ1 and M, w | ϕ2
M,w | [u]ϕ iff ∀w ′ ∈ W : M, w ′ | ϕ
M,w | [i]ϕ iff ∀w ′ ∈ Wi : M, w ′ | ϕ
where i ranges on C and Wu = W . As usual, we say that ϕ is valid in a model M (in symbols, M | ϕ) if and only if for
all w ∈ W we have that M,w | ϕ . Similarly, we say that ϕ is valid in a class of frames, e.g. Cxt (in symbols, Cxt | ϕ), if
and only if it is valid in all the models built on the frames in the class.
Notice that the [u] is the universal operator. Notice also that, while in standard modal logic the truth of [i] and 〈i〉
formulae depends on the evaluation state, the truth of such formulae interpreted on Cxt frames does not. In Cxt frames
truth implies validity, and this is what we would intuitively expect to be the case for the contexts of normative systems.
What holds in the context of a given normative system is not determined by the point of evaluation but just by the system
as such, i.e., by its own rules.
5 Readers are again referred to [15] for a more detailed exposition.
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equivalent to the class TEeq of Kripke frames whose accessibility relations satisfy the following properties: i– j transitivity (if
wRiw ′ and w ′R jw ′′ then wR jw ′′), i– j euclideanicity (if wRiw ′ and wR jw ′′ then w ′R jw ′′), and are such that they contain
an equivalence relation Ru such that for all i ∈ C, Ri ⊆ Ru . The interested reader can ﬁnd a proof of this equivalence in
Appendix A.
2.3.3. Axiomatics of Cxtu
Logic Cxtu results from the union of the schemata of modal logic K45ijn , which axiomatizes contexts [15], with the
schemata of logic S5 axiomatizing the behavior of the global context u, plus the interaction axiom Incl, which just states
that u is the biggest context.
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(
Ki
) [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2) →
([i]ϕ1 → [i]ϕ2
)
(
4i j
) [i]ϕ → [ j][i]ϕ
(
5i j
) ¬[i]ϕ → [ j]¬[i]ϕ
(
Tu
) [u]ϕ → ϕ
(Incl) [u]ϕ → [i]ϕ
(Dual) 〈i〉ϕ ↔ ¬[i]¬ϕ
(MP) If  ϕ1 and  ϕ1 → ϕ2 then  ϕ2(
Ni
)
If  ϕ then  [i]ϕ
where i, j range over the set of indexes C and u denotes the universal context index in C. The interaction axiom Incl states
something quite intuitive concerning the interaction of the [u] operator with all other context operators: what holds in the
global context, holds in every context.6 Soundness and completeness of this axiomatization with respect to Cxt frames are
proven in [15].
2.4. Anderson’s reduction contextualized
Everything has been put into place to provide a contextualization of the version of Anderson’s reduction sketched in
Section 2.2. The fact that ϕ is ideally the case in context i can be formalized as [i](¬ϕ → V) and read as: the negation of ϕ
necessarily implies a violation within context i. It becomes thus possible to express that ϕ is obligatory in the context i of a
given normative system, while ¬ϕ is permitted in the context j of a different normative system: [i](¬ϕ → V) ∧ 〈 j〉(¬ϕ ∧
¬V).
In [15] such reduction has been called a “counts-as reduction of deontic logic”, and it has been proposed also in [30].
Counts-as is the locution introduced in [37,38], and formally investigated for the ﬁrst time in [24], by means of which Searle
presents the basic syntax of constitutive rules, that is, of the building blocks of social reality. From a semantic point of view,
such locution can acquire several different meanings, some of which have been systematically analyzed in [20,19,18,21,15].
One of these senses—the classiﬁcatory counts-as—is there formalized as the strict implication in Cxtu:
ϕ1 ⇒cli ϕ2 := [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2) (5)
Such formalization provides the ground for the counts-as reduction of obligations as statements “ϕ ought to be the case in
context i” as:
Oiϕ := ¬ϕ ⇒cli V (6)
Intuitively, the negation of ϕ counts as a violation in context i, meaning that the negation of ϕ is classiﬁed as a violation
in context i.
Such reduction can be straightforwardly strengthened by considering stronger senses of counts-as. One of these is the
proper classiﬁcatory counts-as, also formalizable in Cxtu as:
ϕ1 ⇒cl+i ϕ2 := [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ ¬[u](ϕ1 → ϕ2) (7)
6 It is worth noticing that, although perspicuous, schema Incl is not necessary in the axiomatics, since it can be derived from 4i j and Tu :
(
4i j
)  [u]ϕ → [i][u]ϕ
(
T u
)+ (N) + (P) + (MP)  [u]ϕ → [i]ϕ
We are indebted to Guillaume Aucher for this observation.
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Oiϕ := ¬ϕ ⇒cl+i V. (8)
Intuitively, the negation of ϕ counts as a violation in context i, meaning that the negation of ϕ is classiﬁed as a violation in
context i (ﬁrst conjunct of the right-hand side of Formula (7)), but the negation of ϕ is not always classiﬁed as a violation
(second conjunct of the right-hand side of Formula (7)).
2.5. Norms as ascriptions
The reduction of deontic to counts-as statements of the type displayed in Formula (7) stresses that a state of affairs
properly determines a violation only within a context, since outside the context that would not necessarily be the case. In
[18] and [15], the rationale behind this formal characterization was taken from Searle’s words themselves:
“[. . .] where the rule (or system of rules) is constitutive, behavior which is in accordance with the rule can receive
speciﬁcations or descriptions which it could not receive if the rule did not exist” [37, p. 35].
Constitutive rules add something to what is already the case and proper contextual classiﬁcation is a way to capture this
intuition. However, there is also another way to look at the novelty introduced by constitutive rules. In a sense, what they
do is to literally introduce new concepts, rather than just validating classiﬁcations which would otherwise not be valid. They
create new terms to be used for a further conceptualization of reality. Such view of rules as ascriptions has a long history,
starting with Pufendorf’s notion of “impositio” [34, pp. 100–101] and has been proposed in legal theory, for instance, in
[23]. As a matter of fact, Searle’s thesis according to which institutional facts are construed upon brute ones [38] can be
viewed an instance of this ascriptive view of social reality.
Now, the central aspect of ascription is language creation. In order for an ascription to take place, a new term needs to
be created, which can then be used for denoting the desired property. If we take an ascriptive view of Anderson’s reduction,
this means that the term “violation” is introduced in order to separate desired or ideal actions or states of affairs from their
undesired or sub-ideal counterparts. Interestingly enough, this exact view is neatly formulated in Jørgensen’s paper which
introduced his dilemma [25]:
“How is a sentence of the form “Such and such is to be so and so” to be veriﬁed? How is it for instance to be veriﬁed
that all promises are to be kept? To this question I know of no other answer than the following: The phrase “is to be
etc.” describes not a property which an action or a state of affairs either has or not, but a kind of quasi-property which
is ascribed to an action or a state of affairs when a person is willing or commanding the action to be performed, resp.
the state of affairs to be produced” [25, pp. 292–293]
The following sections develop a formal analysis of this ascriptive view of norms. The primary technical diﬃculty resides in
providing a suitable formal ground for the representation of language creation. From a propositional point of view, language
creation means that new propositional atoms are somehow introduced in the language and consequently evaluated in the
models. Therefore, in order to model language creation in logic, we should ﬁrst be able to model, within the same logical
framework, different languages. This is an aspect which, at ﬁrst, might look hard to capture in a standard logical framework
since valuation functions are typically not partial, i.e., they evaluate all the atoms in the language. We will see that such
diﬃculty can be overcome by an appropriate use of rather standard semantic means.
3. “In the beginning was the Word”
The present section shows how modal logic offers an elegant way to represent different languages within one same
formalism, without resorting to non-standard tools such as partial valuation functions.
3.1. Adam & Eve
Consider the propositional language L built from the alphabet P of propositional atoms: eat_apple (“the apple has
been eaten”), V (“a violation has occurred”). We have of course four possible models such that: w1 | eat_apple ∧ V,
w2 | eat_apple ∧ ¬V, w3 | ¬eat_apple ∧ V and w4 | ¬eat_apple ∧ ¬V. That is, we have the state in which the
apple is eaten and there is a violation (w1), the state in which the apple is eaten but there is no violation (w2), the state
where the apple is not eaten and there is a violation (w3), and ﬁnally the state where no apple is eaten nor there is a
violation (w4). See Fig. 1.
Obviously, all these states can be distinguished from each other. But suppose now to compare the models ignoring
atom V. Models w1 and w2 would not be distinguishable any more, nor would states w3 and w4. Which is just another
way to say that, had we used a sublanguage Li of L built on the set of atoms {eat_apple}, we would have been able
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to distinguish only states w1 from w3 and w2 from w4. Simplifying the biblical story for illustrative purposes, this latter
language can be viewed as the language at disposal of Adam & Eve in their pre-moral stage, before hearing God commanding
“but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it”. In fact, after hearing God’s command they
became endowed with the possibility to discern good (¬eat_apple) from evil (eat_apple), that is, their language was
enriched and they got to distinguish also states w1 from w2 and w3 from w4. The possibility of making this distinction is
inherent in fact that they are forbidden to eat the apple.
3.2. Propositional equivalence up to a signature
The intuitions sketched in the previous section are here made formal. The signature of a propositional language is its
non-logical alphabet, that is, its set of propositional atoms. Let P = {p,q, r . . .} be a countable set of propositional atoms,
and let L(P) be the propositional language built on P and the usual Boolean connectives. We say that P is the signature of
L(P).
Consider now the set 2P of all possible sub-signatures of L(P). Elements of such set will be denoted P , Q , R, . . . , etc.
Notice that the set of all sub-signatures of L(P) naturally yields a set algebra 〈2P,∪,−,P,∅〉. Two propositional models w
and w ′ of L(P) are propositionally equivalent if they satisfy the same atoms in P. As a consequence, for any formula ϕ of
L(P): w | ϕ iff w ′ | ϕ . If w and w ′ are equivalent (w ∼ w ′) then there is no set Φ of formulae of L(P) whose models
contain w but not w ′ , or vice versa. That is to say, the two models are indistinguishable for L(P).
However, two models which are not equivalent for P may be equivalent for some sub-signature P ∈ 2P . In this case, the
two models cannot be distinguished by only looking at the atoms in P . The following deﬁnition makes such notion formal.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equivalence up to a signature). Two models w and w ′ for a propositional language L are equivalent up to
signature P ∈ 2P , or P -equivalent, if and only if for any p ∈ P ,w | p iff w ′ | p. If w and w ′ are P -equivalent we write
w ∼P w ′ .
Obviously, if w ∼P w ′ then for all ϕ ∈ L(P ): w | ϕ iff w ′ | ϕ . The deﬁnition makes precise the idea of two propositional
models agreeing up to what is expressible on a given signature.
Proposition 1 (Properties of ∼P ). Let W be a set of models for the propositional language L(P). The following holds:
(i) For every signature P ∈ 2P , the relation ∼P is an equivalence relation on W ;
(ii) For all signatures P , Q ∈ 2P , if P ⊆ Q then ∼Q ⊆ ∼P ;
Proof. (i) The following holds: identity is a subrelation of ∼P for any sub-signature P ; and that ∼P ◦ ∼P and ∼−1P are
subrelations of ∼P for any signature P . (ii) If m ∼Q m′ then for all atoms p ∈ Q : w | p iff w ′ | p. Therefore, since P ⊆ Q ,
w ∼P w ′ . 
Besides showing that signature-based equivalence is an equivalence relation (i), Proposition 1 shows also that: (ii) the
bigger the signature, the more ﬁne-grained is the equivalence relation.
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Propositional release logics (PRL) have been ﬁrst introduced and studied in [28,27] in order to provide a modal logic
characterization of the notion of irrelevancy. Irrelevancies are, in short, those aspects which we can choose to ignore. Irrele-
vancy is represented via modal release operators, specifying what is relevant to the current situation and what can instead
be ignored. Release operators are indexed by an abstract ‘issue’ denoting what is considered to be irrelevant for evaluating
the formula in the scope of the operator: Iϕ means ‘formula ϕ holds in all states where issue I is irrelevant’, or ‘ϕ holds
in all states modulo issue I ’ or ‘ϕ necessarily holds while releasing issue I ’. Dually, ∇Iϕ means ‘formula ϕ holds in at least
one of the states where issue I is irrelevant’, or ‘ϕ possibly holds while releasing issue I ’.
Issues can be in principle anything, but their essential feature is that they yield equivalence relations which cluster the
states in the model. An issue I is conceived as something that determines a partition of the domain in clusters of states
which agree on everything but I , or which are equivalent modulo I . Release operators are interpreted on these equivalence
relations. As such, propositional release logic can be thought of as a “logic of controlled ignorance” [28]. They represent
what we would know, and what we would ignore, by choosing to disregard some issues.
3.3.1. Syntax of PRL
The syntax of PRL is the syntax of a standard multi-modal language LPrlm [9] where m is the cardinality of a non-empty
set Iss of releasable issues. The alphabet of LPrlm contains: an at most countable set P of propositional atoms p; the set of
boolean connectives {¬,∧}; a ﬁnite non-empty set Iss of issues. Metavariables I, J , . . . are used for denoting elements of
Iss. The set of formulae ϕ of LPrln is deﬁned by the following BNF:
LPrlm : ϕ ::= 
|p|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ|Iϕ
where I denotes elements in Iss. Boolean connectives and the modal dual ∇I can be deﬁned as usual.
3.3.2. Structure of Iss
One last important feature of PRL should be addressed before getting to the semantics. We have seen that modal oper-
ators are indexed by an issue denoting what is disregarded when evaluating the formula in the scope of the operator. The
ﬁnite set Iss of these issues is structured as a partial order, that is to say, 〈Iss,〉 is a structure on the non-empty set
Iss, where  (“being a sub-issue of”) is a binary relation on Iss which is reﬂexive, transitive and antisymmetric. The aim
of the partial order is to induce a structure on the equivalence relations denoting the release of each issue in Iss: if I J
then the clusters of states obtained by releasing J contain the clusters of states obtained by releasing I . Intuitively, if I is a
sub-issue of J then by disregarding J , I is also disregarded. This aspect is made explicit in the models which, for the rest,
are just Kripke models.
3.3.3. Semantics of PRL
The semantics of PRL is given via the class Prl of frames F = 〈W , {R I }I∈Iss〉 such that:
• W is a non-empty set of states;
• {RI }I∈Iss is a family of equivalence relations such that: if I J then R I ⊆ R J .
Models are, as usual, structures M = 〈F ,I〉 where I is a valuation function I : P −→ P(W ) associating to each atom
the set of states which make it true. PRL models are therefore just S5|Iss| models with the further constraint that the
granularity of the equivalence relations follows the partial order deﬁned on the set of issues, that is, the -smaller is the
issue released, the more granular is the partition obtained via the associated equivalence relation. The satisfaction relation
is standard.
Deﬁnition 3 (Satisfaction based on Prl frames). Let M be model built on an PRL frame.
M,w | Iϕ iff ∀w ′,wRI w ′ : M,w ′ | ϕ
M,w | ∇Iϕ iff ∃w ′,wRI w ′ : M,w ′ | ϕ
where I ∈ Iss. Boolean clauses are omitted. As usual, a formula ϕ is said to be valid in a model M, in symbols M | ϕ , iff
for all w in W , M,w | ϕ . It is said to be valid in a frame F (i.e., F | ϕ) if it is valid in all models based on that frame.
Finally, it is said to be valid on the class of Prl frames (i.e., Prl | ϕ) if it is valid in every frame F in Prl.
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The axiomatics consists of a multi-modal S5 plus the PO (partial order) axiom:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(K) I (ϕ1 → ϕ2) → (Iϕ1 → Iϕ2)
(T) Iϕ → ϕ
(4) Iϕ → IIϕ
(5) ∇Iϕ → I∇Iϕ
(PO) Iϕ →  Jϕ if JI
(Dual) ∇Iϕ ↔ ¬I¬ϕ
(MP) If  ϕ1 and  ϕ1 → ϕ2 then  ϕ2(
NI
)
If  ϕ then  Iϕ
where I, J ∈ Iss. A proof of the soundness and completeness of this axiomatics with respect to the class Prl frames is
exposed in [27].
3.4. PRL with Boolean Algebras
In PRL, the partial order structure on the set Iss is reﬂected by axiom PO in the axiomatics, and by the partial order
imposed on the accessibility relations in the semantics. By adding structure to the partial order on Iss more validities
can be derived which mirror that structure. Interesting for our purposes is the case when Iss is structured according to a
Boolean Algebra. The following propositions lists some of the PRL validities holding in that case.
Proposition 2 (Validities of PRL with BA). Let Iss be ordered as 〈Iss,unionsq,,−,1,0,〉, where the structure 〈Iss,unionsq,,−,1,0〉 is a
Boolean Algebra. The following formulae can be derived in PRL:
1ϕ → Iϕ (9)
Iϕ → 0ϕ (10)
Iunionsq Jϕ → (Iϕ ∧  Jϕ) (11)
Iϕ ∨  Jϕ → I Jϕ (12)
Iϕ ↔ −−Iϕ (13)
(Iϕ →  Jϕ) ↔ (− Jϕ → −Iϕ) (14)
Proof. The desired derivations are easily obtainable: some (Formulae (9), (10), (11)) are just instances of PO, some (Formu-
lae (12), (13), (14)) can be proven by application of PO and propositional logic. 
Notice that the “full release” operator 1 expresses what necessarily holds after releasing all issues in Iss. In fact, it
behaves like a universal operator (Formula (9)). Vice versa, the “empty release” operator 0 expresses what necessarily
holds when nothing is released. In other words, it encodes a quantiﬁcation on all the worlds equivalent to the evaluation
state with respect to the set of issues Iss. Formulae (11)–(14) encode rather intuitive Boolean properties. We will see, in
the next section, that the speciﬁc type of release involved in the notion of ascription, enjoys precisely this structure.
3.5. Propositional sublanguage equivalence as release
Reasoning about propositional sublanguage equivalence is an instance of reasoning in release logic.
Proposition 3 (Sublanguage equivalence models). Consider a propositional language L on the set of atoms P, and a set of states W .
Any valuation function I : P−→ P(W ) determines an Prl model M = 〈W , {∼−P }P∈2P ,I〉 where Iss= 2P is ordered according to
a Boolean Algebra.
Proof. It follows from the properties of ∼P proven in Proposition 1 and from the fact that 2P naturally yields a set alge-
bra. 
Notice that Iss is taken to be 2P , which is ordered by set-theoretic inclusion ⊆. Notice also that the released issues
are taken to be the complements −P of each subsignature P ∈ 2P . In fact, what is released is just what is chosen not to
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So, for example 0 (the empty release) is interpreted on ∼P (standard propositional equivalence), while 1 is interpreted
on ∼ (equivalence with respect to an empty signature).
To put it roughly, what Proposition 3 says is that PRL is a suitable logic to reason about scenarios like the Adam &
Eve one sketched in Section 3.1. Let us get back to that example. Now it is possible to represent both the pre- and post-
God’s commandment situations, within the same formalism, by making use of the release operators of PRL. Suppose Adam
& Eve to be at state w1 in the model with domain W = {w1,w2,w3,w4} and valuation I as in Section 3.1. Recall that
the language was built on atoms P = {eat_apple,V}. So let us denote with {V} and {eat_apple} the subsignatures
containing only atom V and, respectively, atom eat_apple. These subsignatures represent the releasable issues, together
with the empty signature 0 and the full signature 1 = P. Let M = 〈W , {∼{V},∼{eat_apple},∼0,∼1},I〉 be the resulting
release model. We have that:
M,w1 | eat_apple∧ V (15)
M,w1 | 0(eat_apple∧ V) (16)
M,w1 | {V}eat_apple∧ ¬{V}V (17)
So Formula (15) just states what holds in w1, which is the actual state where Adam & Eve eat the apple committing a
violation. Formula (16) does the same by saying that, if you evaluate eat_apple and V after releasing nothing, i.e., by
using the full descriptive power of the language, then both eat_apple and V necessarily hold. In fact, in the model at
issue the set of states reachable from w1 via ∼−0 (i.e., ∼1), coincides with w1 itself, since there are no other states in W
which are equivalent with w1 if all available atoms are used in the comparison. Hence, in the model at issue, 0 refers to
the current evaluation state, i.e., w1. Formula (17) shows what are the effects of releasing atom V. In fact, by abstracting
from V, state w1 is not distinguishable any more from state w2: w1 ∼−{V} w2 or, equivalently, w1 ∼{eat_apple} w2 since
P− {V} = {eat_apple}. So there exists a state w2 ∈ W such that M,w2 | eat_apple∧ ¬V. See Fig. 1.
Formulae (16) and (17) represent Adam & Eve’s situation after and, respectively, before God’s commandment “but of the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it”. Such commandment introduces a further characterization
of reality, exempliﬁed here by the notion of violation, which was not available to Adam & Eve before the commandment
was uttered.
4. Modal aspects of ascriptivism
This section puts logics Cxtu and PRL at work together. Their fusion Cxtu ⊗ PRL on language LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm is all we need
to get the axiomatics and semantics we are interested in.8
The axiomatics Cxtu ⊗ PRL can be directly proven complete with respect to the class of frames TEeq ⊗ Prl since it is
well-known that fusions preserve completeness when the classes of frames characterizing the two logics involved in the
fusion are closed under disjoint unions [13, Ch. 4]. With respect to this, it is important to notice that the fusion TEeq ⊗ Prl
considers the semantics of Cxtu given in terms of TEeq frames. This is necessary because Cxt frames are not closed under
disjoint unions.9 We can now proceed with our formal analysis.
4.1. Ascription formalized
Within logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL it becomes possible to deﬁne an ascriptive notion of counts-as ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2 between any two
formulae ϕ1 and ϕ2, where what is released in the second conjunct of the deﬁnition is the signature of the consequent ϕ2.
This is taken care of by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Ascriptive counts-as: ⇒Asi ). “ϕ2 is ascribed to ϕ1 in context i” is formalized in the logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL, on a
multi-modal language LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm containing the set of issues Iss= 2P as follows:
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2 := [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ ¬[i]σ(ϕ2)(ϕ1 → ϕ2) (18)
where function σ : LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm −→ 2P outputs, for any formula, its signature.
7 It is instructive to notice that although all models based on equivalence up to a signature are Prl models, the reverse does not hold. In fact, the
axiomatization in terms of PRL is too weak to isolate exactly the class of Prl models. Such axiomatic characterization is not needed for the purpose of this
paper. It has nonetheless been provided in [16,17], to which we refer the interested reader.
8 Fusions are the simplest ways of combining logics. For all the technical details about fusions we refer the reader to [13, Ch. 3]. It might however be
worthwhile to concisely recall the basic deﬁnitions. The fusion L′ ⊗L′′ of two modal languages L′ and L′′ is L′ ∪L′′; the fusion of two axiom systems
Ax′ ⊗Ax′′ is Ax′ ∪Ax′′; ﬁnally, the fusion of two classes of frames F′ ⊗F′′ is the class of frames 〈W , R1, . . . , Rn, R ′1, . . . , R ′m〉 where 〈W , R1, . . . , Rn〉 belongs
to F′ and 〈W , R ′1, . . . , R ′m〉 belongs to F′′ .
9 See Appendix A.
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veloped in [20,19,18,21,15]. First, however, notice that by setting ϕ2 = V we obtain a new version of Anderson’s reduction
based on ascriptive counts-as.
To explore the purport of this idea for the analysis of deontic notions let us get back to our running example. God’s
commandment not to eat the apple is a statement eat_apple → V. Roughly, such statement is a stipulation specifying
what God holds to be the case or, better, what holds in the context of God’s commandments. Let such commandments
be set Φ (possibly a singleton). Such set naturally deﬁnes a context i whose extension Wi is just the set of states sat-
isfying Φ .10 Since Φ contains eat_apple → V, such statement can be studied as a classiﬁcatory counts-as statement
pertaining to the context i of divine commands. It corresponds to the validity of strict implication [i](eat_apple → V)
in the model. To represent this, we should add contexts to the PRL model introduced in Section 3.5. Let it be M′ =
〈W , {W ,Wi}, {∼{V},∼{eat_apple},∼0,∼1},I〉. Clearly, [i](eat_apple → V) will be valid in M′ if Wi does not contain
state w2, since M′,w2 | eat_apple∧ ¬V. Leaving technicalities aside, stating [i](eat_apple→ V) in the Adam & Eve
scenario modeled in M′ corresponds to setting the boundaries of the context i of divine norms Φ so that the states are
ruled out in which eating the apple is consistent with the non-occurrence of a violation. The scenario is depicted in Fig. 1.
The context i is highlighted and the only release accessibility relations depicted are the relevant ones concerning atom V.
We therefore get to a new form of reduction in logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL by instantiating Deﬁnition 4.
Deﬁnition 5 (Obligation as ascription of violation: ⇒Asi V). “It ought to be the case that ϕ in context i” is formalized in the
logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL, on a multi-modal language LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm containing atom V and the set of issues Iss= 2P , as follows:
Oiϕ := ¬ϕ ⇒Asi V (19)
Intuitively, ϕ ought to be the case in i if and only if V is ascribed to the negation of ϕ in context i.11 Interestingly,
Deﬁnition 5 well captures the intuition—argued upon in [4]—that the relation between ¬ϕ and V not be of a logical kind
(as in Formula (3)):
“What we would like [. . .] is some sort of “if . . . then—” relation which we can stipulate as true, as we can’t for a logical
or causal “if . . . then—”; in the logical or causal cases the facts are already ahead of us” [4, p. 350].
The fact that V follows from ¬ϕ is not a logical truth since, from Deﬁnition 5, we have that 〈i〉∇{V}(¬ϕ∧¬V). In other words,
the truth of Oiϕ requires that the use of V is necessary to establish the context i of the obligation. Was 〈i〉∇{V}(¬ϕ ∧ ¬V)
false, then the fact that V follows from ¬ϕ would trivially hold in i. In other words, the fact that V follows from ¬ϕ
can really be viewed as a stipulation pertaining context i which ascribes V to ¬ϕ . The ascription of violation amounts to a
classiﬁcatory counts-as12 (ﬁrst conjunct of the right-hand side of Formula (18)) with the further condition (second conjunct)
that the implication does not hold in context i any more if it is evaluated releasing its consequent (in this case the violation
atom V). It is worth stressing that this deﬁnition pulls together several research threads: Anderson’s reductionist tradition,
the formal analysis of counts-as, and the notion of release.
Deﬁnition 5 represents a strengthening of Anderson’s reduction along the line of Formulae (5) and (7). It is worth
spending a few more words on the right-hand side of Formula (19). Its dual version better displays the key idea behind it:
¬〈i〉(¬ϕ ∧ ¬V) ∧ 〈i〉∇{V}(¬ϕ ∧ ¬V). By releasing the consequent V of the ascription, it becomes impossible to distinguish
states which satisfy V from states which falsify V. Now, the deﬁnition says that, in order for an ascription to hold, there is
a state belonging to context i from which another state w ′ outside of context i can be reached which is indistinguishable
from w once V is released, and which falsiﬁes the implicative content of the counts-as (¬ϕ ∧ ¬V).13
4.2. On the properties of ascriptive counts-as
In this section we investigate the structural properties of ⇒Asi as they follow from Deﬁnition 4. We have the two
following theorems.
Theorem 1 (Properties of ⇒Asi : validities). Given Deﬁnition 4, the following formulae of LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm are valid in Cxtu ⊗ PRL:
ϕ2 ↔ ϕ3/
(
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)↔ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ3
)
(20)
ϕ1 ↔ ϕ3/
(
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)↔ (ϕ3 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)
(21)
10 The deﬁnition of contexts by sets of norms has been thoroughly investigated in [21,15].
11 Just like we have deﬁned an obligation operator Oi we can obviously deﬁne permission and prohibition operators: Piϕ := ¬(ϕ ⇒Asi V) and, respectively,
Fiϕ := ϕ ⇒Asi V. Notice that, in Cxtu ⊗ PRL, they are related in the standard way, that is: Fiϕ is equivalent to Oi¬ϕ which, in turn, is equivalent to ¬Piϕ .
12 Note that the stronger form of proper classiﬁcatory counts-as could also be used.
13 Typically, state w satisﬁes ¬ϕ , that is, the antecedent of the counts-as since w and w ′ differ only in the interpretation of atom V. In the Adam & Eve
scenario, for instance, w = w1 and w ′ = w2.
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ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)∧ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ3
))→ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)
)
(22)
((
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)∧ (ϕ3 ⇒Asi ϕ2
))→ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ3) ⇒Asi ϕ2
)
(23)
Proof (Sketch). The proof is routine. We provide the proof of the validity of Formula (22) as an example. Suppose, per
absurdum, that the consequent is false. By Deﬁnition 4, there exists a model M and state w s.t. M,w |[i](ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∧ϕ3)∧
¬[i]σ(ϕ2∧ϕ3)(ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3). Since from the properties of [i] follows that M,w | [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3), it also follows that
M,w | [i]σ(ϕ2∧ϕ3)(ϕ1 → ϕ2∧ϕ3) which is impossible given M,w |[i]σ(ϕ2)(ϕ1 → ϕ2) and M,w |[i]σ(ϕ3)(ϕ1 → ϕ3),
since σ(ϕ2) ⊆ σ(ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3) and σ(ϕ3) ⊆ σ(ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3). 
Theorem 2 (Properties of ⇒Asi : invalidities). Given Deﬁnition 4, the following formulae of LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm are not valid in Cxtu ⊗ PRL:
ϕ ⇒Asi ϕ (24)(
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)→ (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)
(25)
(
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)→ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3
)
(26)
((
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)∧ (ϕ2 ⇒Asi ϕ3
))→ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ3
)
(27)
((
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)∧ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ3
))→ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ⇒Asi ϕ3
)
(28)
(
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)→ (¬ϕ2 ⇒Asi ¬ϕ1
)
(29)
Proof (Sketch). The proof is routinary. As an example, we provide countermodels for Formulae (27) and (29). Formula (27):
∀w ∈ W , M,w | ϕ1 → ϕ3; ∀w ∈ Wi , M,w | ϕ1 → ϕ2 and M,w | ϕ2 → ϕ3; and ∃w ∈ Wi,∃w ′,w ′′ ∈ W s.t.: w ∼−σ(ϕ2)
w ′ and M,w ′ | ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3; w ∼−σ(ϕ3) w ′′ and M,w ′′ | ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3. Formula (29): ∀w ∈ Wi , M,w | ϕ1 → ϕ2
and ∃w ∈ Wi,∃w ′ ∈ W s.t. w ∼−σ(ϕ2) w ′ and M,w ′ | ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 and ∀w ′′ ∈ W if w ∼−σ(ϕ1) w ′′ then M,w ′′ | ϕ1 →
ϕ2. 
So, ascriptive counts-as satisﬁes the core of the structural properties of counts-as isolated in [24], i.e., left and right logi-
cal equivalence (Formulae (20) and (21)), disjunction of the antecedents (Formula (23)) and conjunction of the consequents
(Formula (22)), and it falsiﬁes transitivity (Formula (27)). It also falsiﬁes reﬂexivity (Formula (24)), antecedent strengthening
and consequent weakening (Formulae (25) and (26)), and cautious monotonicity (Formula (28)). Most interestingly, contra-
position (Formula (29)) also fails. The failure of contraposition is a remarkable aspect of ⇒Asi since contraposition was one
of the problematic properties of the classiﬁcatory view of counts-as. Ascription seems therefore to be a fruitful development
of the classiﬁcatory perspective pursued in the line of work presented in [20,19,18,21,15].
4.3. Ascription and other forms of counts-as
At this point it is worth spending a few words about the relative strength of the ascriptive view of counts-as with respect
to the other forms of counts-as isolated in the aforementioned line of work, and in particular the classiﬁcatory counts-as
(⇒Cli ) and the proper classiﬁcatory counts-as (⇒Cl+i ). Let us brieﬂy recall their deﬁnitions in logic Cxtu14:
ϕ1 ⇒cli ϕ2 := [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2)
ϕ1 ⇒cl+i ϕ2 := [i](ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ ¬[u](ϕ1 → ϕ2)
Obviously, for any ϕ1,ϕ2 it is the case that ϕ1 ⇒cl+c ϕ2 strictly implies ϕ1 ⇒clc ϕ2. What about the relationship between
⇒cl+i and ⇒Asi ? In fact, they are structurally very similar. The ⇒cl+i -versions of Formulae (20)–(23) are all valid, and the
⇒cl+i -versions of Formulae (24)–(28) all fail as shown in [18,15]. The only difference seems to be contraposition, which
holds for ⇒Cl+i and fails for ⇒Asi . So, the ascriptive counts-as appears to be stronger, but can this be proven semantically?
Unfortunately, logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL is not suitable for answering this question, and the reason is the following one.
Proposition 4 ([u] = 1). Neither [u]ϕ → 1ϕ nor 1ϕ → [u]ϕ are valid in the class of TEeq ⊗ Prl frames.
Proof (Sketch). We provide a countermodel for 1ϕ → [u]ϕ . Take a model M and state w such that ∀w ′ ∈ W , if wRIssw ′
then M,w ′ | ϕ and ∃w ′′ ∈ W such that wRuw ′′ and M,w ′′ |ϕ . Model M is the desired countermodel. An analogous
countermodel can be built for [u]ϕ → 1ϕ . 
14 Notice that LCxtn ⊗LPrlm has the necessary expressive power.
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clusters. This is an interesting property of Cxtu ⊗ PRL indicating that its model-theory is too weak to force a coincidence
between the universal context operator [u] and the full release operator 1 which sounds intuitive, since both [u] and 1
should behave like universal operators.15 This suggests that logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL should be extended with axiom [u]ϕ ↔ 1ϕ
to provide a suitable framework for the comparison of the ascriptive view of counts-as with the forms studied in [20,19,18,
21,15].
The study of the meta-logical properties of logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL ∪ {[u]ϕ ↔ 1ϕ} is left for future work. Now, what is
important to be shown is that once the equivalence of [u] and 1 is assumed, the following can be easily proven to hold.
Theorem 3 (⇒Asi vs. ⇒cl+i ). In all TEeq ⊗ Prl frames validating [u]ϕ ↔ 1ϕ , ascriptive counts-as is strictly stronger than proper
classiﬁcatory counts-as, that is:
• The following formula is valid:
(
ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)→ (ϕ1 ⇒cl+i ϕ2
)
(30)
• The following formula is not valid:
(
ϕ1 ⇒cl+i ϕ2
)→ (ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2
)
(31)
Proof. The validity of Formula (30) follows from the fact that in TEeq⊗Prl frames 〈u〉ϕ1∧¬ϕ2 follows from ¬[i]σ(ϕ2)(ϕ1 →
ϕ2). To prove this, for the semantics of [i] and I we have that for any model M and state w , if M,w | ¬[i]σ(ϕ2)(ϕ1 →
ϕ2) then there exists w ∈ Wi and w ′ ∈ W such that M,w | ∇1¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2). Therefore, by [u]ϕ ↔ 1ϕ , it follows that
M,w | 〈u〉¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2). The countermodel for Formula (31) is given by setting Wi = ∅ and imposing the existence of a
world s verifying ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2. 
The fact that ascriptive counts-as is strictly stronger than proper classiﬁcatory lies ultimately on the fact that ascriptive
counts-as requires non-empty contexts: [i]⊥ → ¬(ϕ1 ⇒Asi ϕ2). The validity of this property with respect to TEeq⊗Prl frames
is easily checked semantically. In fact, none of the senses of counts-as analyzed in [20,19,18,21,15] enjoys this property, and
in a way this is not surprising, since the ascription of a property to something should presuppose the existence of that
something.
4.4. On the properties of the ascriptive reduction
In the two preceding sections we have analyzed the structural properties of ascriptive counts-as. Here we do the same
with respect to the ascriptive reduction of deontic notions given in Deﬁnition 5. The question we answer with the following
two theorems is how the ascriptive reduction of the deontic operators behave with respect to SDL
Theorem 4 (Validities of deontic ascription). Given Deﬁnition 5, the following formulae/rules of LCxtn ⊗LPrlm are valid/sound in Cxtu ⊗
PRL:
(Oiϕ1 ∧ Oiϕ2) → Oi(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) (32)
¬Oi
 (33)
 ϕ then  Oiϕ (34)
Proof. [Formula (32)] We reason semantically proceeding per absurdum. Assume there exists a model M and state w such
that M,w |Oi(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) and M,w | Oiϕ1 ∧ Oϕ2. By Deﬁnition 5 we have that M,w | ¬(¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ⇒Asi V) and hence,
by Deﬁnition 5, that M,w | 〈i〉((¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∧ ¬V) or M,w | [i]V((¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2) → V). Now, given the assumption, the
ﬁrst disjunct is clearly impossible as M,w | [i]((¬ϕ1 → V) ∧ (¬ϕ2 → V)), and the same holds for the second disjuncts
as M,w | ¬[i]V(¬ϕ1 → V). [Formula (33)] We proceed per absurdum. By Formula (19) and Deﬁnition 5 we have, for
a pointed model M,w , that M,w | [i](⊥ → V) ∧ 〈i〉∇{V}(⊥ ∧ V). But the second conjunct is clearly impossible. [Formula
(34)] Straightforward by propositional principles. 
Theorem 5 (Invalidities of deontic ascription). Given Deﬁnition 5, the following formulae of LCxtn ⊗ LPrlm are not valid in Cxtu ⊗ PRL:
Oi⊥ (35)
¬Oi⊥ (36)
15 See Section 3.4.
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Oi(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) → (Oiϕ1 ∧ Oiϕ2) (38)
Oiϕ1 → Oi(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) (39)
Proof. We provide counter-models for each formula. Let ϕ = ϕ1 = p and ϕ2 = q [Formula (35)] By Formula (19) and Deﬁni-
tion 5 the desired counter-model can be obtained by setting I(V) = W . Hence there exists no state w which has access via
∼V to a state satisfying ¬V. [Formula (36)] To obtain a counter-model it suﬃces to set Wi ⊆ I(V) and to require that there
exists at least one state falsifying V. [Formula (37)] The counter-model is similar to the one of Formula (36) but it requires
the reachability via ∼V of two states from Wi , one satisfying p ∧ ¬V and the other satisfying ¬p ∧ ¬V. [Formula (38)] The
desired counter-model M is made like this: W = {w1,w2}, Wi = {w1}, I(p) = ∅, I(q) = {w2}, I(V) = {w1} and ∼V= W 2.
We have that M,w1 | Oi(p ∧ q) ∧ ¬Oiq. [Formula (39)] Let us deﬁne the counter-model M as follows: W = {w1,w2},
Wi = {w1}, I(p) = ∅, I(q) = {w2}, I(V) = {w1} and ∼V= W 2. We have that M,w1 | Oi p ∧ ¬Oi(p ∨ q). 
Let us comment upon these ﬁndings. First of all notice that the necessitation rule (Formula (34)) remains sound. On
the other hand, the distribution principle of Oi over ∧ holds only in its right-to-left direction (Formula (32)) while it fails
from left to right (Formula (33)). Trivial obligations (Formula (33)) are not possible, and the impossibility of contradictory
obligations, as well as their possibility, are both invalid. In particular, by looking at the counter-model of Formula (36) you
can notice that ⊥ is obliged when all states in i are violation states but there is a state which is violation-free and which
is reachable via release. An instance of the D axiom of SDL also fails (Formula (37)). Notice that since we do not have
distribution over conjunction Formulae (36) and (38) are not equivalent. Perhaps not surprisingly, what also fails is the
scheme of the so-called Ross’s paradox (Formula (39)): “if you ought to slip the letter into the letter-box, then you ought to
slip it or burn it” [36]. The counter-model shows very well why. Although there might be states, indifferent with respect to
V, where not sending the letter does not imply a violation, this does not guarantee there also be states where not sending
the letter and burning it does not imply a violation. In general, ascribing a property to a set of states does not imply the
ascription of the same property to a smaller set of states.
All in all, the deﬁnition of deontic operators based on ascriptive counts-as yields a weaker system of SDL. By inspecting
the proof of Theorem 5 we can also ﬁnd what precisely determines the weakness of the logic of Oi as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5,
namely the requirement that for ¬ϕ ⇒Asi V to be true there needs to exist a world, outside context i, which veriﬁes ¬ϕ
and ¬V.16
4.5. Cxtu ⊗ PRL, enthymemes and friendliness
Before moving on to the next section, in which logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL will be applied to provide a formal analysis of two
benchmark problems in deontic logic, we want to put the logic in perspective with some related work done by Makinson
in the ﬁeld of non-monotonic reasoning like, in particular, [32,33].
In Section 2.2 we have brieﬂy recapitulated the notion of contextual classiﬁcation ﬁrst introduced in [18]. Contextual
classiﬁcation has been deﬁned as an implicative statement holding with respect to a context, i.e., a set of valuations or, in
the modal logic terminology, possible worlds or states (Formula (5)). The role of a context is to limit the set of states with
respect to which the implicative statement is evaluated in order for it to represent a classiﬁcation holding locally in the
model. Contexts can therefore be viewed as hidden collections of premises.
Inferences with hidden premises have a long history in logic. The ancient Greeks used to call them enthymemes from en,
in, and thymos, mind, so as to mean some knowledge that is left implicit and kept in the mind. Contextual classiﬁcations
state enthymemes in a very precise sense, the hidden premises being the logical theory of their context. A statement “ϕ1
counts as ϕ2 in context i”, interpreted as contextual classiﬁcation, can therefore be rephrased as “it follows (classically) in
the set of propositional models Wi that ϕ1 implies ϕ2”. Enthymemes have been studied as special consequence operations
in [32], where they are shown to provide a bridge between classical logic and non-monotonic logics. In that work the notion
of enthymeme is captured by a speciﬁc logical consequence operation called pivotal-valuation consequence [32, Ch. 3]. With
slight abuse of notation we denote with w(ϕ) = 1 that a propositional valuation w assigns 1 to a propositional formula ϕ .
Deﬁnition 6 (Pivotal-valuation consequence). Let W be the set of valuations of a propositional language L built on P. A for-
mula γ2 follows from γ1 modulo the set of valuations Wi ⊆ W iff there is no valuation w in Wi such that w(γ1) = 1 and
w(γ2) = 0.
It is easy to see that Formula (5) is just the formalization of Deﬁnition 6 in a modal language. In fact, we can restate
Deﬁnition 6 in terms of the validity of Cxtu formulae on logically universal Cxt models, that is, those models containing
16 It might be worth noticing that this aspect is strictly related with what discussed in relation to Theorem 3.
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A propositional formula γ2 follows from γ1 modulo the set of valuations Wi ⊆ W iff:
M | [i](γ1 → γ2)
(
i.e., M | γ1 ⇒cli γ2
)
(40)
So contextual classiﬁcation and pivotal-valuation consequence are, formally speaking, the same notion (in the class of logi-
cally universal models). It follows that modal logics at least as strong as Cxtu can represent the notion of pivotal-valuation
consequence in a modal language.17
While pivotal consequence can be expressed already in Cxtu , the related notion of friendliness [33] requires the fusion
Cxtu ⊗ PRL. Let us ﬁrst deﬁne it.
Deﬁnition 7 (Friendliness). Let W be the set of valuations of a propositional language L built on P. A propositional formula
γ is friendly for the ﬁnite set of formulae Γ if and only if for all valuations w on P such that w(
∧
Γ ) = 1, there exists a
valuation w ′ which agrees with w on all atoms in σ(Γ ) (i.e., the signature of Γ ) and such that w ′(γ ) = 1.
Also in this case, it is easy to reformulate Deﬁnition 7 in language LCxtn ⊗LPrln within the class of logically universal TEeq⊗
Prl models where the release relation is interpreted as sublanguage equivalence. Let M be such a model. A propositional
formula γ is friendly for the ﬁnite set of formulae Γ if and only if
M | [u]
(∧
Γ → ∇−σ (∧Γ )γ
)
(41)
In words, all states are such that if they satisfy all the formulae in Γ then, by releasing the whole alphabet except the
signature of Γ (i.e., by not releasing the signature of Γ ), they have access to a state which satisﬁes γ . Notice that, unlike
the pivotal-consequence relation, friendliness is not monotonic. To appreciate this, set Γ := {p} and γ = p ∧ q. Obviously
friendliness is lost adding ¬q to Γ .
To conclude, although developed for radically different purposes, logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL features the expressive means to
capture two notions of supraclassical consequence relations, one monotonic (contextual classiﬁcation), one not (friendliness).
Although of deﬁnite interest, a detailed investigation of the formalization of these notions in Cxtu ⊗ PRL goes beyond the
scope of the present paper. So, in the next section, we turn to the applications of ascriptive counts-as in the context of
deontic logic.
5. Putting the ascriptive view at work
Section 4.4 has put the ascriptive view of norms, as formalized here, in perspective with standard deontic logic showing
also how, for instance, it does not suffer of Ross’s paradox. In the present section we proceed at situating the ascriptive
view of norms with respect to some classical issues of deontic logic. In particular we show how this view of norms offers
an original perspective from which to address Chisholm’s paradox [11] and Jørgensen’s dilemma [25].
5.1. An ascriptive glance at Chisholm’s paradox
We follow the presentation of the paradox given in [5].
1. It ought to be that Smith refrains from robbing Jones.
2. Smith robs Jones.
3. If Smith robs Jones, he ought to be punished for robbery.
4. It ought to be that if Smith refrains from robbing Jones he is not punished for robbery.
Once “Smith robbing Jones” is represented by r and “Smith refraining from robbing Jones” by ¬r and, similarly, “Smith being
punished” by p while “Smith not being punished” by ¬p, this set of ordinary language sentences—also called the Chisholm’s
set—can receive the following formalizations within SDL, which differ in the way they symbolize the conditional statements
at points 3 and 4.
i) O¬r ii) O¬r iii) O¬r iv) O¬r
r r r r
r → Op O(r → p) r → Op O(r → p)
¬r → O¬p O(¬r → ¬p) O(¬r → ¬p) ¬r → O¬p
17 The interested reader is referred to [18] where it is shown that the operator ⇒clc of contextual classiﬁcation satisﬁes all the properties characterizing
pivotal-valuation consequences, that is: reﬂexivity, monotonicity, transitivity, disjunction of premises, and supraclassicality, where supraclassicality means
that via pivotal-valuation consequence more can be inferred than what can be classically inferred, which is what is guaranteed by axiom schema Incl in
logic Cxtu .
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It becomes then evident that SDL falls short in properly representing the Chisholm’s set since: in i) the 4th statement
¬r → O¬p is a logical consequence of the 2nd r, which is not the case in the ordinary language formulation; in ii) the
3rd statement O(r → p) is a logical consequence of the 1st O¬r, which is also not the case in the ordinary language
formulation; ﬁnally, in iii) and iv) both Op and O¬p are logical consequences of the set and hence O⊥, which is clearly
counter-intuitive.
Let us see how the Chisholm’s set can be dealt with in our framework. The better way to do that is to have a model-
theoretic look at the paradox. Let P := {p, r,V1,V2} and C = {i}.18 Notice that, unlike in the Adam & Eve’s example, two
violation constants are needed here: V1 for the ascription of primary obligations, and V2 for the ascription of contrary-
to-duty obligations. The TEeq ⊗ Prl model M = 〈W , {W ,Wi}, {∼I }I∈2P ,I〉 representing the Chisholm’s scenario is given in
Fig. 2. The model consists of all possible propositional valuations of P, some of which are clustered in context i (the states
belonging to the context are highlighted). Such context consists of the truth set of the propositional version of the ﬁrst three
sentences of the Chisholm’s set, i.e., {r → V1, (r ∧ ¬p) → V2, p → V1}.19 To reduce clutter, only the relevant sub-language
equivalence relations are depicted. It is easy to see that the model validates the following representation of the ﬁrst three
sentences of the Chisholm’s set in terms of ascriptive counts-as statements:
r ⇒Asi V1 (42)
(r ∧ ¬p) ⇒Asi V2 (43)
p ⇒Asi V1 (44)
In addition, it also validates [i](V2 → V1) and ¬[i](V1 → V2). That is, the occurrence of a violation of a contrary-to-duty
norm logically implies that a violation of a primary norm already occurred, and not vice versa.20 Intuitively, this is so
because the violation of a contrary-to-duty norm cannot occur without a violation of a primary norm.
Given this representation, it is clear that nothing paradoxical happens in states satisfying r (i.e., the last sentence of the
Chisholm’s set). In those states, which are V1-states, if p is not the case, than also V2 is the case. To get back to ordinary
language, Fig. 2 shows that a natural and consistent interpretation of the Chisholm’s scenario in terms of ascriptions goes
as follows:
1. A primary violation is ascribed to states in which Smith robs Jones (Formula (42));
2. Smith robs Jones;
3. A contrary-to-duty violation is ascribed to states in which Smith robs Jones—and hence in which a primary violation
already occurred—and he is not punished (Formula (43));
4. A primary violation is ascribed to states in which Smith is punished (Formula (44)).
The Chisholm’s scenario can therefore be accommodated in a rather natural way by means of ascriptive counts-as and
assuming two violation atoms logically related in such a way that the worse violation results to be logically stronger.
With respect to this, notice also that in case we want to introduce deontic operators by deﬁnitions of the type given
18 Only one context is at issue in the paradox.
19 This context might seem to include too many states (e.g., the state satisfying only V1). A smaller context could be obtained by replacing implications
with biimplications. We refrain from doing so as we want to stick to the letter of the paradox.
20 These two last constraints could also be set to be of a global type, that is, to occur in the scope of [u] instead of [i].
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Formulae (42)–(44) could be rewritten as:
OV1i ¬r (45)
OV2i (r → p) (46)
OV1i ¬p (47)
where each obligation keeps track of the ascription on which it depends.
5.2. An ascriptive glance at Jørgensen’s dilemma
Before concluding, we now show how Deﬁnition 5 provides an interesting angle from which to look at Jørgensen’s
dilemma [25]. The ﬁrst of the ten philosophical problems urging today’s deontic logic according to [22] was the problem,
already formulated in [31], concerning a suitable foundation of deontic logic in the face of Jørgensen’s dilemma:
“How can deontic logic be reconstructed in accord with the philosophical position that norms are neither true nor false?”
[22, p. 3]
It is our claim that the ascriptive view of norms can provide the ground for such a reconstruction. Let us sketch how
this would work in the case of Adam & Eve scenario. There, God’s commandment does three different things at the same
time. First, the commandment deﬁnes the context i of divine norms. As such, formula eat_apple→ V deﬁnes the “logical
space” [35, p. 6] of the normative system at issue, i.e., its context (e.g., states w1,w3,w4 in Adam & Eve’s example).
Notice that, as such, eat_apple→ V is properly speaking neither true nor false, but it is rather taken or assumed to be
true, exactly like an axiom. Second, the commandment teaches Adam & Eve how to recognize, to say it with Searle [38],
states with a certain “institutional” property (‘violation’) on the ground of a “brute” property (‘eating the apple’). Third, the
commandment increases the granularity of Adam & Eve’s language so that they can distinguish state w1 from state w2 (and
w3 from w4) by making use of suitable “institutional” terms. This is the aspect of language creation proper of the ascriptive
view of norms. To sum up, a norm ϕ → V in a set of norms Φ works like an axiom deﬁning the context i of the set of
norms Φ , and deﬁnes the violation term V by ascribing it to term ϕ built from some “brute” language.
With respect to the third point, notice that the statement eat_apple→ V is neither true nor false if a “brute” language
is spoken, where the “institutional” term V is not used. In fact, in the scenario there are states in the model where neither
{V}(eat_apple→ V) nor {V}¬(eat_apple→ V) are true. That is why, to say it with Jørgensen, norms correspond to
“quasi-properties” of reality [25, pp. 292–293]. Properties, or to use Searle’s terminology again, “brute facts” hold indepen-
dently of the human ascriptive activity, while “quasi-properties” or “institutional facts” hold only as a result of ascription,
and in this sense they are in a way less true. Notice, however, that this notion of truth is not the technical one used
in Kripke semantics: the notion of truth in Jørgensen’s dilemma (i.e., truth as what is evaluated as true given the brute
language) is not the Kripke notion of truth (i.e., truth as what is evaluated as true given the whole language). The logic
presented here generalizes this distinction to any possible partition besides the “brute” vs. “institutional” one.
6. Conclusions and future work
The paper has analyzed, by making use of modal logic techniques, the notion of ascription as it emerges from some
philosophical contributions to the theory of norms. In particular, by providing Anderson’s reduction with suﬃcient modal
means for supporting a notion of context and of linguistic indistinguishability, the paper has provided an original deﬁnition
of deontic statements as forms of ascriptions (Deﬁnition 5). Such deﬁnition has been compared with SDL (Theorems 4
and 5) and its underlying notion of counts-as has also been confronted with formalizations of counts-as available in the
literature (Theorems 1–3). The proposal has then been applied to provide original analyses of the Chisholm’s paradox and
of Jørgensen’s dilemma.
Future work will focus on two aspects. First, the study of logic Cxtu ⊗ PRL extended with axiom [u]ϕ ↔ 1ϕ , and of
the less standard fusion of logic Cxtu with the logic characterizing equivalence up to a signature presented in [16]. This
will give a full spectrum of modal systems offering means for the clariﬁcation of the notion of ascription. Second, all the
systems taken into consideration in the paper are of a static kind. The dynamic aspect of ascription—including both aspects
of context and release dynamics—will be studied by making use of some form of update logic in the spirit of, for instance,
[8]. Some results in that direction have already been published in [7].
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Appendix A. Alternative semantics for Cxtu
The present section introduces an alternative semantics for language LCxtn based on a class of frames whose accessibility
relations are able to simulate contexts. Such class of frames is proven equivalent to the class of Cxt frames introduced in
Section 2.3.
Language LCxtn can be given a semantics via the class of TEeq frames F = 〈W , {Ri}i∈C〉 such that:
• W is a non-empty set of states;
• {Ri}i∈C is a family of relations which are i– j transitive (if wRiw ′ and w ′R jw ′′ then wR jw ′′), i– j euclidean (if wRiw ′
and wR jw ′′ then w ′R jw ′′)21;
• there exists a relation Ru ∈ {Ri}i∈C such that Ru is an equivalence relation and for all i ∈ C,w ∈ W : wRiw ′ implies
wRuwi .
In short, these frames consist of the domain W and of a ﬁnite number of accessibility relations containing an equivalence
relation Ru such that, for all i ∈ C, Ri ⊆ Ru . The following proposition clariﬁes the relationship between this semantic, and
the one based on Cxt frames.
Proposition 5 (Semantic equivalence of Cxt and TEeq frames). For any formula ϕ on LCxtn : TEeq | ϕ iff Cxt | ϕ . That is, Cxt frames
and TEeq frames deﬁne the same logic.
Proof. [⇐] From right to left: for every ϕ , Cxt | ϕ implies TEeq | ϕ . The proof is obtained by showing that a Cxt can
always be transformed into a TEeq frame in a way that preserves modal formulae. F = 〈W , {Wi}i∈C〉 be a Cxt frame. Deﬁne
now for all i ∈ C a relation Ri ⊆ W 2 such that wRiw ′ iff w ′ ∈ Wi . Clearly, Ru is the universal relation and every universal
relation is an equivalence relation, which also includes all Ri ’s for any i ∈ C. Now, to prove i– j transitivity, suppose that
wRiw ′ (w ′ ∈ Wi ) and w ′R jw ′′ (w ′′ ∈ W j). It follows therefore that wR jw ′′ . The proof of i– j euclidicity is perfectly anal-
ogous. Suppose that wRiw ′ (w ′ ∈ Wi) and wR jw ′′ (w ′′ ∈ W j), hence w ′R jw ′′ . Hence, the constructed frame 〈W , {Wi}i∈C〉
is a TEeq frame. It follows that for any Cxt model a TEeq model can be built by simply keeping the same valuation function
which clearly satisﬁes the same LCxtn formulae. [⇒] From left to right: for every ϕ , TEeq | ϕ implies Cxt | ϕ . In this case,
the proof is obtained by showing that every TEeq frame, which is also point-generated, can be turned into a context frame
which is equivalent with respect to LCxtn formulae. Let us denote with g(TEeq) the class of point-generated TEeq frames.22
From modal logic we know that point-generated subframes preserve modal validity [9, Ch. 3.3], so it suﬃces to show that
every g(TEeq) frame can be transformed into a Cxt frame. For any Ri let ri(w) = {w ′ | wRiw ′}. The desired construction
is obtained by setting, for any i ∈ C, Wi = ri(w) where w is the root of the point-generated frame. It can now be shown
that for every w ′,w ′′ if there exists an Ri-path from w to w ′ and from w to w ′′ , then w ′Riw ′′ iff w ′′ ∈ ri(w). From left to
right, if there exists an Ri-path from w to w ′ and w ′Riw ′′ , then by transitivity (which is a special case of i– j transitivity)
wRiw ′′ , that is, w ′′ ∈ ri(w). From right to left, if there exists an Ri-path from w to w ′ and w ′′ ∈ ri(w), then wRiw ′′ and
hence, by euclidicity, w ′Riw ′′ . It is then easy to see that ru(w) = W . 
So TEeq frames are modally equivalent, with respect to language LCxtn , to Cxt frames. However, as made explicit by
the proof, they consist of a larger class of structures, as Cxt frames are in one-to-one correspondence only with the class
of point-generated TEeq frames. Although this difference cannot be noticed by LCxtn formulae, it does have an important
model-theoretical consequence, namely that while the class of Cxt frames is not closed under taking disjoint unions,23
the class of TEeq frames is. This depends, ultimately, on the fact that Cxt frames contain a universal relation, which is
notoriously not closed under taking disjoint unions, while TEeq frames simply work with an equivalence relation containing
all the contextual accessibility relations. This model theoretic properties is essential for the fusion studied in Section 4. This
notwithstanding, Cxt frames are clearly more appealing from an intuitive point of view, as they are less technical and able
to capture the view contexts as sets of (propositional) models in a direct way.
References
[1] A.R. Anderson, The formal analysis of normative concepts, American Sociological Review 22 (1957) 9–17.
[2] A.R. Anderson, The logic of norms, Logique et Analyse 2 (1958) 84–91.
[3] A.R. Anderson, A reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic, Mind 22 (1958) 100–103.
21 The terminology is borrowed from [29] where a similar class of frames is studied.
22 Recall that a point-generated frame is a frame in which for each accessibility relation Ri , each state is reachable from the root via an Ri path [9].
23 For this important model-theoretic notion the reader is referred to [9, Ch. 3.3].
112 D. Grossi / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 95–112[4] A.R. Anderson, Some nasty problems in the formal logic of ethics, Nôus 1 (1967) 345–360.
[5] L. Åqvist, Good samaritans, contrary-to-duty imperatives and epistemic obligations, Nous 1 (1967) 361–379.
[6] L. Åqvist, Deontic logic, in: D. Gabbay, F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Vol. II: Extensions of Classical Logic, Reidel, 1984, pp. 605–
714.
[7] G. Aucher, D. Grossi, A. Herzig, E. Lorini, Dynamic context logic, in: X. He, J. Horty, E. Pacuit (Eds.), Proceedings of LORI 2009, in: LNAI, vol. 5834,
Springer, 2009.
[8] J. van Benthem, J. van Eijck, B. Kooi, Logics of communication and change, Information and Computation 204 (11) (2006) 1620–1662.
[9] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, Y. Venema, Modal Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
[10] H. Bohnert, The semiotic status of commands, Philosophy of Science 12 (4) (1945) 302–315.
[11] R.M. Chisholm, Contrary-to-duty imperatives and deontic logic, Analysis 23 (1963) 33–36.
[12] P. d’Altan, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, R.J. Wieringa, An integrated framework for ought-to-be and ought-to-do constraints, in: Y.H. Tan (Ed.), Working Papers of the
Workshop om Deontic and Non-Monotonic Logics, Rotterdam, 1993, pp. 14–45.
[13] D.M. Gabbay, A. Kurucz, F. Wolter, M. Zakharyaschev, Many-Dimensional Modal Logics. Theory and Applications, Elsevier, 2003.
[14] C. Ghidini, F. Giunchiglia, Local models semantics, or contextual reasoning= locality+ compatibility, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 127 (2) (2001) 221–259.
[15] D. Grossi, Designing invisible handcuffs. Formal investigations in institutions and organizations for multi-agent systems, PhD thesis, Utrecht University,
SIKS, 2007.
[16] D. Grossi, Linguistic relevance in modal logic, in: A. Nijholt, M. Pantic, M. Poel, G.H.W. Hondorp (Eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Belgian–Netherlands
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (BNAIC’08), University of Twente, 2008.
[17] D. Grossi, A note on brute vs. institutional facts: Modal logic of equivalence up to a signature, in: Guido Boella, Pablo Noriega, Gabriella Pigozzi, Harko
Verhagen (Eds.), Normative Multi-Agent Systems, in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, vol. 09121, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2009.
[18] D. Grossi, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, F. Dignum, Classiﬁcatory aspects of counts-as: An analysis in modal logic, Journal of Logic and Computation 16 (5) (2006)
613–643, Oxford University Press.
[19] D. Grossi, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, F. Dignum, Counts-as: Classiﬁcation or constitution? An answer using modal logic, in: L. Goble, J.-J.Ch. Meyer (Eds.), Proceed-
ings of DEON 2006, in: LNAI, vol. 4048, 2006, pp. 115–130.
[20] D. Grossi, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, F. Dignum, Modal logic investigations in the semantics of counts-as, in: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL’05), ACM, June 2005, pp. 1–9.
[21] D. Grossi, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, F. Dignum, The many faces of counts-as: A formal analysis of constitutive-rules, Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2) (2008) 192–217.
[22] Jörg Hansen, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Leendert van der Torre. Ten philosophical problems in deontic logic, in: Guido Boella, Leon van der Torre, Harko Ver-
hagen (Eds.), Normative Multi-Agent Systems, No. 07122 in DROPS Proceedings, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik
(IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, 2007.
[23] H.L.A. Hart, The ascription of responsibility and rights, in: A. Flew (Ed.), Logic and Language, Blackwell, 1951.
[24] A.J.I. Jones, M. Sergot, A formal characterization of institutionalised power, Journal of the IGPL 3 (1996) 427–443.
[25] J. Jørgensen, Imperatives and logic, Erkentniss (1937) 288–296.
[26] S. Kanger, New fondations for ethical theory, in: R. Hilpinen (Ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reidel Publishing Company,
1971, pp. 36–58.
[27] J. Krabbendam, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, Release logics for temporalizing dynamic logic, orthogonalising modal logics, in: M. Barringer, M. Fisher, D. Gabbay,
G. Gough (Eds.), Advances in Temporal Logic, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2000, pp. 21–45.
[28] J. Krabbendam, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, Contextual deontic logics, in: P. McNamara, H. Prakken (Eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems, IOS Press, Ams-
terdam, 2003, pp. 347–362.
[29] A. Lomuscio, M. Sergot, Deontic interpreted systems, Studia Logica 75 (2003) 63–92.
[30] E. Lorini, D. Longin, A logical account of institutions: from acceptances to norms via legislators, in: G. Brewka, J. Lang (Eds.), International Conference
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR), Sidney, Australia, 16/09/08–19/09/08, AAAI Press, 2008, pp. 38–48.
[31] D. Makinson, On a fundamental problem of deontic logic, in: P. McNamara, H. Prakken (Eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems. New Studies in
Deontic Logic and Computer Science, in: Frontiers in Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Applications, vol. 49, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 29–53.
[32] D. Makinson, Bridges from Classical to Nonmonotonic Logic, Texts in Computing, vol. 5, King’s College Publications, 2005.
[33] D. Makinson, Friendliness and sympathy in logic, in: Logica Universalis, Birkhäuser Verlag, 2005, pp. 191–206.
[34] S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Clarendon Press, 1934 (edition of 1688).
[35] M. Ricciardi, Constitutive rules and institutions, Paper presented at the meeting of the Irish Philosophical Club, Ballymascanlon, February 1997.
[36] A. Ross, Imperatives and logic, Philosophy of Science 11 (1) (1944) 30–46.
[37] J. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.
[38] J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, Free Press, 1995.
[39] R. Stalnaker, On the representation of context, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 7 (1998) 3–19, Kluwer.
